

Summary

Edmund Husserl's genetic phenomenology is characterised by an ambiguity. On the one hand, we are reaching the very core of phenomenological philosophy (as we are reaching the last suppositions of structures of meaning), on the other hand we must pose the question of whether we are not stepping outside the very border of phenomenology. In a certain moment of his philosophical life Husserl began holding an opinion that change and development also concern the transcendental structures. Particular structures of experience are tied by relations of dependency on the ground of their development; the earlier structures are supposed by the later ones, the later structures are based on the earlier ones. Genetic phenomenology becomes a description of the dynamic whole of experience. As the meaning of every part of experience is dependent on its place within the dynamic whole, it is not possible to attain a phenomenological understanding of any area of experience without clarifying the inner relations and inner principles of that whole. As the system of strata of experience is a projection of development, the genesis is, in a way, still present.

The book attempts to present this dynamic whole of strata of foundation by means of a gradual descent into still deeper suppositions of structures of meaning. As a guide in this advancement, a tracing of the genesis of subject-predicate relation was used. The first three levels of this descent into the strata of foundation are to be found in the area of logic. Husserl criticises formal logic for not being interested in structures which are supposed by the laws of formal logic and without which the meaning of those laws cannot be recognised. These levels of foundation are identified with three levels of logic: the pure science of forms of judgment (which deals with laws of transforma-

tion, compossibility and the decomposition of figures of meaning), the logic of consequence (which deals with laws of implication and exclusion in a wider web of meaning), and the logic of truth (which deals with the unification of the logical structure and a “logic of the world”).

The logical structures are based on structures of pre-predicative experience. Husserl finds the origin of categories of subject and predicate in the act of “objectivation” (*Vergegenständlichung*) which is characterised as an act occurring between active and passive areas of experience. The book clarifies the nature of passive areas of experience and of such phenomena as “association” and “affection”, and describes relation between the passive and active areas.

Then the advancement to the strata on which judgment is based continues to an area of pre-passive, instinctive intentionality. In this area we can recognise the most elementary structures which create the ultimate level of the foundation of judgment. In this context the book deals with the relation between genetic phenomenology and psychoanalysis, with correspondences and differences between both disciplines. Finally, the deepest level of the foundation of judgment – and the deepest level of synthesis – is the level of the constitution of time, on which all the rest of syntheses is based.

The last section of the book concerns Husserl’s idea of the genesis of structures of meaning as a development of the “universal intentionality” in the history of mankind. “Universal intentionality” is identified with “universal teleology” whose effect history is. Husserl also puts forth the question as to whether we have the right to restrict the genesis of transcendental structures only to the area of the history of mankind and indicates that there is a need of asking for a foundation of these structures in structures of organisation which precede human experience. In this way there is the possibility of changing phenomenology – by means of fulfilling its own principles – into a philosophy of a dynamic whole of the universe.