Summary

Subtitled as “prolegomena to the analytic philosophy” this book rests in the decision to see this influential philosophical trend not as a radically new phenomenon but rather as an old project guided by a specific approach, the linguistic turn, supplemented, particularly in the philosophy of late Wittgenstein and Robert Brandom, by a specific pragmatic and social twist. The book’s basic claim is that philosophy is not only another – possibly the highest – of the sciences as Aristotle believed with his “(first) philosophy as science of being qua being” or as Husserl with his “philosophy as rigorous science” seemed to think, but something qualitatively different as proposed by Plato’s “philosophy as dialog” or Wittgenstein’s “philosophy as therapy” that, unlike scientific knowledge, cannot be written down or said but only practiced under the penalty of becoming completely meaningless or systematically misleading. Another claim is that Kant addresses the same problem by delimiting philosophy as an a priori activity that stems from reason itself by reflecting on the conditions of possibility of (empirical) sciences. Brandom generalizes this very idea by calling philosophy, in conjunction with logic, the “organ of semantic self-consciousness.”

Under the headings of the book’s title, Idea, Number, and Rule, the text is structured into three parts corresponding to the traditional disciplines of pure reason in which self-consciousness comes through, i.e. Philosophy, Mathematics, and Logic. The specific role is attributed to the philosophy of mathematics based on the claim that mathematics, due to its complicated, indirect epistemic nature, can serve philosophy as an important mediating case,
as its history – from Plato through Kant to Wittgenstein – clearly indicates. By showing that even in the realm of mathematics the meaning is necessarily pragmatic and social phenomenon one is about to gain decisive support for the both, linguistic and pragmatic or social turn where meaning is explained as a matter of the rule-governed discursive practices to the extent that “to mean,” “to know,” or “to refer” are not properties of some individual or group of them but normative stances one must adopt (undertake a commitment) and be recognized as such (be subject to the attribution of a commitment).

Among the topics discussed and critically examined in the book belong Wittgenstein’s dictum of unsayability of philosophy, the problems and paradoxes of identity, metaphysical nature of modal semantics, (de)sinterpretations of pragmatism and its roots in the philosophy of Frege, reconciliation of semantic holism with semantic atomism, conceptual development of the basic mathematical notions (such as continuity, function, number etc.), philosophical consequences of Gödel theorems, Cantor’s diagonal argument and related paradoxes, development of logic and its alleged universal character, the fates and philosophical significance of Frege’s logicism and Hilbert’s program, sustainability of Plato’s definition of knowledge, and many others.