

Summary

In the introductory chapter of the book, I present the life of the philosopher Ladislav Hejdíánek in the context of historical and life events, against the background of which his thinking is better understood. In the second chapter, I construct Hejdíánek's conception of non-political policy in its difference from anti-politics (the rejection of politics as such) and the general politicalness of man. I put it positively on the reciprocity of the fight against a) the *expansion* of politics into non-political spheres (2.1) and b) the political *disengagement* of commitments from non-political spheres, i.e. the politics of interests, which, together with non-political politics, form the decisive background of power politics (2.2). I support this duality by identifying non-political policy as, on the one hand, a form of education and transformation of consciousness, and, on the other, a mere instrumental watchdog activity. The duality is also accompanied by a distinction between two types of power policy – true (taking care of the space for education and free exercise of all citizens) and false (caring solely for itself and power) – and the presence of a *policy of interests* in true power policy (2.2-2.3). This does not mean, however, that *true politics* can be identified with non-political politics, because the essence of non-political politics is *democracy*, which consists in caring for the development of the fullness of life and the humanitarian fraternal idea, i.e. in fundamentally limiting the sphere of political power. I present the non-political political democratization process as a primarily *internal* activity that discovers the possibility of a life of freedom formed in relation to others and truth. Even socialism, as a movement that later spread the principles of Christianity and democracy on a social level, cannot be identified with a non-political policy of maintaining personal, unaccounted for, and friendly relations as more than simply economic-political affairs, as what is based on the orientation of belief as inclinations to action (2.4). The characteristic of man as a political animal recognized since ancient times makes the defense against the expansion and emancipation of power a challenge to people to take on the role to which they are essentially called. In this role, it is necessary to distinguish between power, interest, and non-political politics. An interdependence works between all these types of policies, which without each other would lose their meaning. This then supports the tendency towards a permanent and not just temporary (crisis) intervention of non-political policy in society (2.5). Finally, I ask the question of the relationship between politics, faith, and philosophy, i.e. above all whether the basic life orientation

of a philosopher (a spiritual person) is decided by politics or politicalness in the similar way as faith. Hejdánek's emphasis on political activity (in the whole enumerated scale, but with an emphasis on non-political politics) of a proper (Christian) believer and an educator (philosopher) indicates that at least to some extent, it is. Philosophy is always applied in the political sphere, i.e. in addition to the reflection of politics it is also a politically educational and cultivating act (2.6) which can be carried out by resistance and/or clarification – depending on the type of power behavior (2.7).

In the analysis of Hejdánek's conception of *Charter 77*, in the third chapter I follow a specific (implemented) *educational* project of non-political policy, which is not governed by any specific programs or schedules. Even legality, respect for human rights, and morality as privileged characteristics are not the first and last goal of the Charter. Despite the lack of a specific program, however, this non-purpose initiative is dominated by neither relativism nor mere opposition to the regime. The decisive characteristics and operation of the Charter do not result, as is generally thought, from its watchdog character (watchdog of a post-totalitarian regime), but from its specific relationship to a specific truth. Non-political politics conceived in this way – from the point of view of politics minimalistically (no statutes, goals, power, or opposition) and from the point of view of culture, the public, or perhaps even philosophy maximalistically (a public created by text and call to change consciousness and life) proves to be an activity capable of maintaining a dynamic relationship to the truth even in wider society and politics and at the same time to function in the long run and to transform politics and society (by developing the imagination, working with concepts, and by reflective thinking in general).

In the interlude *Intellectual and Politics* (4) I question the developed concept of reciprocity of true politics with non-political politics using Hejdánek's distinction (from the controversy with Václav Havel) between an intellectual, non-political politician and a politician, with emphasis on the opposition of political and (higher) intellectual-cultural activities which, in their strongest form, transform consciousness and orient individuals and society. Hejdánek's argument that politicians play only an instrumental role ultimately turns out to be "secondary" to the whole of his work. While non-political policy is based on the view that caring for and reviving the cultural and spiritual heritage of a national community is a more pressing problem than all politics, including the violation of human rights and the suppression of fundamental freedoms, this does not mean neutralizing these rights and freedoms, and these policies with them. Both politics, and these freedoms and rights,

will really (long-term and broadly) be “improved” only in the context of a proper revival of the consciousness of the nation and the people in it, of course with them being part of this revival and participating in the transformation of consciousness.

In the fifth chapter, I examine broader thought contexts (Hejdánek’s ontology, the concept of reality and the living, including the concept of man, and the determination of politics, philosophy, and their reciprocity based on them) as an argument for the political action of the philosopher and people of spirit and word. Hejdánek’s non-objectively oriented understanding of man and reality claims the preference of non-objective challenges over givenness. The challenges that an imperfect world needs to correct itself are those that a person needs to assert himself: still, he does not abandon what is (given), but recognizes and develops *promising givenness* over the unpromising one with the help of a *new one* (challenge). This new one must be a *revealed* one, not a *random* new one, i.e. it must prove itself in the given situation. The emphasis on humanity in its non-objective, i.e. not the “given” indeterminate dimension, is also the basis of the concept of freedom as a departure from the given and leads to a non-national, non-civic concept of human rights. However, both these rights and freedom are unthinkable without others and the programs that are prepared and enforced in cooperation with them, which, however, is never taken care of by the power policy inclining toward the givenness and therefore lastly dividing. This is why it must be balanced by a non-political policy that is non-purposeful and non-power-oriented (5.1).

Hejdánek’s political involvement is further connected with the principled rejection of purely abstract theorizing. An accurate and critically productive view is provided by the individual combining *philosophy with staying at home*: the fertility of philosophical reflection (distance) presupposes a rooting (even in the political one in the case of man as such), understanding the situation in all its breadth and depth (5.2.1). The philosopher is thus an undomesticable domestic being: in the “given home” he seeks and builds the “true home”, but this is no abstraction – if the philosopher already has universalist ambitions, then it is more about the universalism of literature than the universalism of science. To this he adds criticality and systematic thought (5.2.2) which, however, stands at the reception of non-objective challenges which belong to the given situation as its most dynamic element; this is the philosopher’s starting point – for example, in creating temporary programs and rankings of the values of a given community (5.2.3).

In the sixth chapter, I follow the topic of the fifth chapter from a different angle. I examine Hejdánek’s emphasis on truth (6.1), reflection, and

the life totality (6.2) and practicality emerging from it, and the *effectiveness* of a life reflecting the truth (6.3). Part of the third emphasis is the identification of the orientation to the truth with the orientation to the weak and oppressed at the expense of respect for morality, theory, and self-care. This is why I associate Hejdánek's position with the concept of "political realism".

Hejdánek attributes two characteristics to the truth, in a sense contradictory though not exclusive: on the one hand it "actively" intervenes in reality, by its transcendent origin acting against established practice and worldview, on the other hand it turns person towards things and action – even if they are non-objective facts in their openness (6.1). A person thus committed to the truth first *transcends the given conditions to form history* (6.1.1), which can be seen in a) the example of the proper work of a historian (just as a non-political politician must understand, evaluate, and participate in meaningful events, not just observe and describe facts) (6.1.1.1–2) and b) the nature of a true philosophical question, i.e. a question evoking the *dynamics* of a given (not only philosophical) situation (6.1.1.3). Secondly, one transcends the *psychological plane* (self-awareness) *in order to establish oneself in reflection*, i.e. so that the truth is enforced in the middle of him and through him in the middle of the world. This reflection is therefore a practice, a humanization of man and the world (6.1.2). Theory and system are then aids to this crucial practice in reflection (6.1.3).

The path to a proper subject is conditioned not only by the transcendence of psychologizing tendencies, but also by the tendency towards individuality and private life: it is crucial to establish oneself in relationships and communion with others – and through them also with the truth. Respectively, something needs to be *done* (self-satisfaction and assuming a stance are not enough), which is only possible together with others and for others – the truth is indivisible, either it is enforced all around or it is not, just as it is impossible to become human without humanizing the world (6.2). However, uniqueness and personal identity are not suppressed, this is only an *eventual identity*, based on the integration of what is *to be*, to a certain extent always at the expense of the *given* (present and past), namely in its non-life, non-perspectiveness (6.2.1). Hejdánek promotes the identity of *events as a whole* against the identity of invariably given essences in man, reason, and larger communities (6.2.2). Thus, a person takes care with personal commitment of what does not belong to him and never will (the coming future) and withdraws from what is imposed on him (given feelings, thoughts, actions). In this sense, non-political politics is a *struggle with oneself*: to stand on the side

of truth against oneself is infinitely more difficult than to stand on the side of truth against power (6.2.3).

Finally, I show in what sense the orientation to the truth takes the form of the orientation to the weak and oppressed (6.3). This orientation attributes to the truth the criterion of *materiality, practicality* – albeit in a higher sense than adapting to circumstances. In addition to the criterion of *improving* the given situation (helping the impoverished), this entails an unusual criterion of *freedom* in addressing, which deprives the individual of “his” plans and bias in the “given” (6.3.1). That practicality, however, also diminishes the obsession with truth – it tames it so that it is accessible *to reason* and *to other people*, so that it is *more a remedy, a truth fulfilled than a truth known*. The truth itself, which one looks at in reflection, calls for this, because it bears its temporality and variability as its own closest characteristic: such truth is not neutral, it does not reveal what is already there, but in its eventual nature it transforms everything else it needs, for which a person is necessary. Thus, although this living, approaching truth lacks the universality of objective science, it retains a certain (non-political-political) universality: the advocacy of the powerless and the oppressed. Otherwise, political power cannot be legitimized: it must improve the situation, i.e. reduce injustice, cruelty, and the impoverishment of the people. The *defense* of the impoverished and the *repair* of damage suggest limitations, however, they can be understood as a full-fledged program consisting in a fuller and more accurate understanding and expression of fundamental rights and freedoms (6.3.2), resp. consisting in the true *liberation* of man from everything that distracts him from the decisive realities here and now. The fact that the program can be declared “universally” explains the connection between the truth approached above and the powerless: it is about freedom as an openness to others and the world, including the non-objective reality in their powerlessness (6.3.3).

The orientation of non-political policy towards a non-objective reality and impoverished others necessarily leads to *indecency* (7). This, in its difference from the calculated and conformist way of life, is the virtue of a generous life, a life based on a deeper ontological-cosmological level, on which only questions of the meaning of life are openly asked (7.1). The principles of decency are followed by *laws* and *law*, showing a similar lack of respect for the whole and humanity, which come to the fore only in the notion of *justice*. Laws can have higher ambitions of justice – when they are understood in terms of *value* (7.2). I closely link laws and law, which represent certain values, with *ethics*: they do not originate in human nature (natural law theo-

ry) or in agreements between people (contractual theory), but in non-objective challenges, the hearing of which presupposes the proper treatment of the individual in his *dignity*, i.e. primarily others helping him as a child and adolescent to actively enter the world of speech and thought and thus transcend the given, including “himself”. The emergence of a true subject (the integrated life of an individual on non-objective challenges) thus accompanies his socialization and the creation of a community of mutually inclined subjects. Relationships with others, however, at this level of “relationship with man” are not just a matter of education, morality, and society, but of our *being*. The highest criteria have their origin and support in the living existence (dignity) of man. This is not about human self-centeredness, because that living existence or dignity lies in *activity* towards a better world and divinity: human rights are based on the best human activities and ideas, and vice versa, their *effectiveness* is what is crucial (7.2.1).

The specific ontological status of the basis of human rights (human dignity as part of the cosmic and historical order) implies that human rights as a support for human existence are among the self-existing normative realities that we, like the truth, do not have, but they have us. Despite the status of non-existent ideas, they are similar to us in their comprehensiveness and *temporality* – they enter the world “just in time”, they belong to a non-objective reality which develops together with spatio-temporal, bodily reality, although it is always “a long step ahead” (7.2.2). These living ideas, norms, can be understood and sufficient only by those who, in a life bound to them, create new norms and value ladders for life here and now (7.2.3). Thus, in this orientation towards the revealed and the future, man does not transcend the world (Patočka), but the given. The source of time and freedom is not man’s relationship to the radically different (idea), but time (and freedom) is itself the source of the relationship to the other, the radically new, because it is centered around the truth. By emphasizing the non-existent, holistic nature of being (they are more what they are not – but should be – than what they are), Hejdánek implies the need to understand time through things and especially living beings, people. There is no need to detach oneself from the world, it is enough to reveal it in its eventual and non-objective dimension (7.2.4). In this context, Hejdánek abandons decency as a “stereotypical” morality of the majority in favor of an ethic of extraordinary performance, genius. However, the inclination towards the non-objective side of the world and elite performances is for the benefit of all people – see only the concentration of time around the events of the truth, which is on the side of the declassified. In other words, instead of considering the social requirements

(decency), there is the consideration of the internal requirements of thinking, which, however, is practical, reflects the overall historical and world situation; the philosopher and non-political politician who are inspired by the genius take into account the *effectiveness* of the truths seen by the genius (7.2.5). Although the law and laws may be similarly indecently undefined (counterfactual) today, when they look to legitimacy and constantly regulate legality, they can never explain a person's personal actions and the life of a person who goes further and higher and forms new ones (7.3).

I explained the distance to decency against the background of connections and contradictions between decency, law, legality and justice, legitimacy, elementary rights and human dignity (existence). From here I also came to the need to distinguish between the concepts of morality and ethics, which is specified in chapter (7.4), which defines ethics as a struggle with objectivity (i.e. especially with the misery of the world), as striving for what is to be. I add two principles to this definition: a) submission to an *ideal law*, b) management of what is *fundamentally important* to a cultivated individual. This *important* opens up ethical attitude to other than just moral-ethical interests: an ethic containing a meaningful notion of human dignity and freedom only makes sense if there are people who behave freely and with dignity, i.e. have well-thought-out and discussed ideas on how to live and what to do, and they have the desire and courage to prepare with others their common programs (7.4.1). The *ideal* argument is that an ethic containing a meaningful notion of human dignity and freedom only makes sense if there are laws-principles that are not subject to the conditions of the time, but as inspiration and guidance help creative personalities change the world. In these idealities, to which one does not adhere by argument in discussion but rather by general life orientation and life belief, the individual is oriented by the so-called *donation to principles*; donation also involves revealing what these principles cause or could cause in the world here and now, resp. reveals the highest values or their opposites in the seeming trifles of everyday life (7.4.2).

Instead of a modern orientation towards the (autonomous) individual, Hejdánek relies on a *practical life orientation*, with which, however, he does not associate so much observance of various duties and imperatives as rather *conscientious insights*. These insights do not contain the life interests, feelings, and motivations of the individual, but the challenges of the future which break into life and, thanks to them and conscientious reflection, one recognizes new criteria of action suitable for the new situation (7.4.3). In the political sphere, this preference for objectivism over subjectivism is reflected in a penchant for political realism at the expense of moralism. Again, it is

practical: the emphasis on politics also strengthens the ethical attitude, i.e. in contrast to moralization it is necessary to look for a strong political partner, an ethic that keeps a community unpolluted by lies and unified; it can then direct politicians to moderation in political power struggles. Hejdánek thus promotes a policy involved in the life of truth, but only minimalistically, i.e. not in such a way that it is subordinated to ethics, but that it forms a *single whole* with it (as well as with art, religion, science, etc.) (7.4.4).

Hejdánek's "extension" of the political sphere to include non-political politics (chapters 2 and 3) challenged the ensuing examination when the two "types of politics" – non-political and power – appeared to be *contradictory*. Just like the thesis of enlargement, however, the thesis of the contradiction of the two policies and the interpretation of the emergence of non-political politics from the *transfer* of politics from the sphere of power to the spiritual sphere did not prove appropriate: placing a politician in opposition to a philosopher, intellectual, or non-political politician would be a mistake. In the eighth chapter, I specify Hejdánek's conception of true and false politics and their relation to non-political politics, i.e. mainly the *affinity* of the technical-power policy of true and non-political politics (8.). The position of non-political politics against the politics of power and the intellectual (philosopher) against the politician first weakens the stronger and even the only irreconcilable contradiction – the politics of right and wrong. The difference is that the real politician is linked to non-political politics by his efforts to relate to the whole and to enable the formation of the mentality of citizens (8.1). The coherence of the two policies thus conditions the recognition of the authenticity or significance of entities higher than the individual (8.1.1); the distinction between private and public relations is not an inclination to intimate private relations versus public-political relations, but rather an emphasis on the need for a politician to be deeply rooted in life and to participate in unity and the whole beyond his person (8.1.2). I do not base the contrast between true and false politicians only on the distinction between different types of units, but rather on different ways of relation to the whole: the pseudo-politician succumbs to the given and fulfills the self-offered, past-prepared possibilities, while the real politician lives from the "ungiven" in order to open the hitherto non-existent horizons of action and thought. Thus, the real politician participates in the whole integrating non-objective challenges, and in his case politics becomes "the art of realizing the improbable" (8.1.3).

The ways a politician relates to the whole therefore converges a true politician with the non-political, namely in relation to non-objective challenges

(truth) and in their implementation, i.e. in the *care for the humanization* of society and the world. A true politician thus strives to maintain space for such a direct (philosophical, personal) relation to the truth and its maximum interest in the community (8.2). Of course, everyone carries out that care in their own way: the philosopher by establishing and maintaining the identity and integrity of the individual, the politician by establishing and maintaining the integrity of the community (8.2.1). However, the efforts of politicians should not forget the primacy of persons and should look first and foremost at them, i.e. maintain human relations (“humanity”) even in the middle of *political* relations. This justifies Hejdánek’s “normative” anthropology, according to which an individual is more who he should be than who he is, and this “ungiveness” leads to (free) action despite the circumstances. The politician’s community and power, as well as the philosopher’s system and contemplation, are only part of the path that is the care of people and humanity in this ungivenness (8.2.2). However, Hejdánek does not want politics to be non-purposeful or philosophical, but only not to be subject to pure purposefulness, not to resign to orientation in the whole, and not to liquidate non-purposeful activities in the village. The philosopher, in turn, is not called to politics, but only to participate in the creation of comprehensible and meaningful perspectives for the future. And the individual cannot make decisions and live outside the framework of philosophy (education) and politics (society): both professions legitimately empower him, so that his reasonable answer is their co-creation (8.2.3). The similarity between the activities of a true politician and a philosopher (non-political politician) limits the difference between the levels on which each carries out his activities and the methods by which he achieves what he desires. The directness and uncompromisingness of the helpless philosopher stands in contrast to the calculatingness and compromise-seeking by the powerful politician. The difference weakens the philosopher’s establishment of “public reason” which he uses in the transition from the apodictic language of the academic philosopher to the credible language of “ordinary” life. Thus, in competition with various voices, including irrational ones, the philosopher seeks to reach an agreement for his views – not in immediate political practice, but in a theoretically based activity in a broader sense whose concepts seek response in the activities of immediate political practice (8.2.4).